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Context of Abortion: 
10th Anniversary Reflections on Roe v. Wade 
George H. Williams 
The author is an ordained min-
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Christ and the Unitarian Univer-
salist Association, founding presi-
dent and chairman of Americans 
United for Life, and Hollis pro-
fessor of divinity, emeritus at Har-
va rd University's Divinity 
School. This paper was given at 
the Graduate Theological Union, 
Berkeley, California. 
In the context of a service of song, scripture and prayer through 
which we have passed together, I propose as the text of my message 
the words sung by Father Carey Landry, director of the Institute for 
Life Studies in Berkeley : 
Does a mother forget her baby? Or a woman the child within he r womb? 
Yet even if these forget, yes, even if t hese forget, I will never forget my own 
(Isaiah 49: 15). 
This is the version from the Greek Bible, the Septuagint, translated 
by Jewish scholars in Alexandria before the birth of Jesus. The Hebrew 
text is a bit less precise, but the fact that Alexandrian Jews would 
have turned the Hebrew into the Greek concern of the mother for the 
child within her is itself substantive testimony to the theme we treat 
here. 
As a Protestant minister and church historian , I would not have 
been presented by the sponsoring Institute for Life on this occasion if 
I were primarily a biologist. Yet I trust you will allow me to give more 
than a mere rehearsal of familiar genetic and embryological facts. 
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When I reread Roe v. Wade, I was struck by the fact that Jane Roe 
is the fictitious name of a woman, Norma McCorvey, who was raped 
on a dark road in Texas. But her pseudonym is suggestive. In the realm 
of fish, her name means eggs which, when ejected seasonally, are 
fertilized in the prodigal thousands by the milt of males. 
One of the ineffaceable memories of my life is of walking early one 
spring morning toward a pond from which the winter's ice had just 
disappeared. As I approached, the rising sun shed intense morning gold 
upon that pond rimmed with male and female goldfish slithering on 
their sides amid and above sodden autumn leaves in an ecstasy of 
simultaneous ejection and fertilization. Their gilded scales, with white 
underbellies here and there exposed, gave that mirror of morning-still-
ness blue a vibrant frame. 
From fish to human families, the Creator has toiled in the won-
drous evolution of procreation toward the eventual interiorization of 
this life ecstasy of creation/procreation until it eventually would be 
consummated within the body of the female mammal. It is true that 
some tropical fish and also sharks are viviparous. The bellies of female 
guppies, for example, swell and release scores of newborn fish in 
danger of their own parents, as well as of other kinds of fish and other 
predators. There are several kinds of fish so specialized that after the 
external fertilization, the male takes the young carefully into his 
mouth for brooding and protection. Through these and other mar-
velous means, some fish, especially the small species, have contrived to 
produce fewer eggs and less milt and still survive. 
But everyone knows that these procreational resorts of a small per-
centage of fish are only superficially analogous to mammalian develop-
ment of the fetus in the womb. As with fish, there are mammalian ova 
and a specialized kind of milt, spermatozoa, * which also have half the 
chromosomes of the somatic cell and even of the ovum before it has 
undergone the halving process, meiosis. 
, 
This process for the generic egg is called specifically oogenesis; for 
the spermatogonium, spermatogenesis. The technically accurate term 
for the counterpart of the sperm is ootid or ovum. Those of us not 
familiar with the details of modern genetics may be unaware that the 
primordial cluster of generic cells from which sperm and ova derive 
(on a monthly basis in a woman), have the same number of chromo-
somes as somatic cells, namely 46, and that only after meiosis in 
several phases do the sperm and ova of 23 chromosomes, the haploid 
generation, make their periodic appearance, the sperm much more 
numerous than the mensually available ova. The mammalian sperm in 
*Following the common usage of physicians and also that of Linacre Quarterly, 
sperm is henceforth used for the singular and the plural of what is technically 
the (haploid) spermatozoon (plural: spermatozoa). Its female counterpart is 
the (haploid) ootid, in this article called ovum (plural: ova). 
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particular are capable of a simple though short life of their own, 
swimming like diminutive pollywogs through the uterus up into t he 
Fallopian tube. The outer fringes of the funnel-like distal end of this 
tube - and there are two such tubes - are open to the body cavity. At 
some risk, the ovum descends from the oviduct through body tissue 
toward that same receptive funnel. The sperm is chemotropically 
guided toward the ovum to form the zygote, a cell of the full comple-
ment of 46 chromosomes (hence the diploid generation), but with a 
random assortment of genes in the chromosomes from the sperm and 
the ovum. The zygote develops the blastocyst, then the morula, a 
cluster of undifferentiated cells, 32 or 64 in the cluster. For the male 
component of the zygote, the descent into the uterus represents a 
second visit. 
At this point, we pause to marvel at the biological problem that had 
, to be solved by mammalian reproduction in the primordial urge of 
protecting progeny, thereby reducing the number necessary for the 
perpetuation of the species and making the individual members of a 
species also less dependent on the vagaries of an external environment. 
The problem is that the haploid sperm and, to a somewhat lesser 
extent, the diploid zygote represent foreign bodies in the female, ever 
in danger of rejection of sperm and zygotes. 
Amphibians managed to move beyond fish to internal fertilization, 
but with the rather quick expUlsion of their fertilized eggs. Occa-
sionally, quite inventive ways of taking care of the externally hatched 
young were developed. In some frogs, for example, the internally 
fertilized ova might be expelled and immediately placed in skin sacs 
on the back of the female for protection', to grow through the polly-
wog stage in the fluid therein. 
Further Advances 
The next great advances we"e made by reptiles and then birds: 
internal fertilization in the intestine and the formation of a shell 
around each zygote which protects it from the pressure of the female's 
body and the other fertilized eggs growing within it. The shell also 
inhibits the female reptile or bird from ejecting the eggs as chromo-
somatically foreign bodies until such time as the fertilized eggs 
develop a sufficient shell to be incubated externally in the sand under 
the sun or under the warm feathered body of the female bird or, in 
some cases, both parents. 
The next great advance was made by marsupials, an order of 
mammals without a placenta. Again with internalized fertilization by 
copulation, the resultant diminutive young extrude themselves from 
their mother and, on their own, climb toward the pouch, whence the 
name of the order. The pouch functions at once as an external uterus 
in the sense of a protective enclosure, while the young marsupials suck 
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as true mammals from the teats on the warmer side of that pouch. We 
can extrapolate from what we know of the more primitive semi-
mammalian egg-laying platypus and surmise that the first marsupials, 
now extinct, would have only had milk oozing from the prox imate 
skin of the pouch without benefit of teats. 
The ultimate advance in the creative drive to enable the mother to 
protect progeny was the development of the placenta, a marvelous 
structure. There could be no fossil of the first mammalian placenta 
sloughed off as afterbirth, but it is the ultimate reproductive achieve-
ment that made possible the profusion of mammalian life with rela-
tively limited progeny and with bodily maternal protection during 
gestation and with a bond built up for parental care and even training 
of the young. In the highly structured wolfpack, usually only the lead 
wolf and his mate copUlate. The other pack members become com-
pletely involved in the life of the one litter of cubs who find their 
places as they grow into the wolf society. 
Before making further reference to such refinements of the drive to 
enhance the care of offspring, we must understand the placenta, the 
complexity of which has only recently been understood in the context 
of the evolution of the reproductive process I have been summarizing. 
In order to achieve the maximal protection of the young, the 
mammalian placenta evolved partly out of the tissue of the zygote-
turned-morula. The fetal half of the placenta, derived from the 
trophoblast as developed by the zygote, has the same diploid cells as 
the embryo from which it was functionally divided off in the process 
of implantation in the uterus. That process itself bestirs the uterus to 
develop a counterpart placenta (the decidua) which, in the case of 
human females , covers the whole interior of the womb, but is most 
swollen with tissue and blood vessels right opposite the umbilical 
cord. With its two arteries and one vein, the cord is wholly a develop-
ment of the embryo. 
The two blood systems are never in direct contact during gestation. 
That is the histochemical miracle of the placenta. The placenta 
belongs partly to the mother, partly to the embryo. Fetologically, it is 
therefore incorrect to say that the life in the developing amniotic sac 
belongs to the mother's body or is part of her body. It is precisely 
because even the placenta is not wholly of her body that the life 
growing within the mother is not ejected as foreign. It is quite 
probable that what are called natural abortions are most often rejec-
tions by the pregnant female of embryos in early stages which are 
created by two sperm which have penetrated a single ovum . Conse-
quently, they are inviable in more than one sense, the more important 
being that they have twice as many male chromosomes as they should 
and that is more than the decidual or maternal half of the placenta can 
cope with. Such a mismating would, in any case, be monstrous and the 
provision is there for its often unnoticed rejection prompted by the 
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mother's inner receptors sensitive to something exceeding the norm. It 
is a marvel, further, that there are so relatively few ectopic implanta-
tions, such as in the abdominal cavity, in the Fallopian tube, or in 
parts of the womb, strategically difficult at the moment of 
parturition. 
The miracle of the reproductive cycle of mammalian life was 
unknown to the Stoics and other philosophers and to Thomas Aquinas 
who followed Aristotle on fetology with its successive ensoulments. 
All these ancients were adduced by the Supreme Court in Roe u. 
Wade, almost as if to obfuscate the biological facts well known when 
the Court ruled . The extraordinary role of the placenta to prevent the 
rejection of a foreign body and thus to enhance the steady biological 
drive toward ever-enhanced protection of fewer progeny within the 
protective body of the mother had become known, in contrast, 
perhaps only a decade before the Court ruling. That women con-
tributed genetic material equal to that of the male was known for a 
biological certainty only in the first quarter of the 19th century, 
although some ancient physicians and some Christian thinkers, like 
Tertullian, insisted that what they saw in the countenances of their 
offspring and recognized in their traits was as much from the mother 
as from the father. But the regnant theory from antiquity to almost 
modern times was that the male seed bore the distinctiveness of the 
offspring who was simply nurtured on what, in ignorance, was called 
the menstrual blood. The microscopic realm of chromosomes and the 
electronically perceived realm of the genes was unknown to the 
majority of the physicians, philosophers and lawmakers cited by the 
Court in Roe u. Wade. 
Appearance of Scholarship 
Though the decision has the appearance of scholarship, it is as if a 
decision by the same Court about nuclear warfare or nuclear plants 
should summarize the history of astrology and alchemy to reach a 
verdict on whether a state like California or South Carolina can 
respond to the fears of its citizens and interpose itself with respect to 
an unsafe nuclear plant despite the federal monopoly over the regula-
tion of nuclear power. In Roe u. Wade, the Court almost perversely 
mingled ancient and medieval fetology with modern biological testi-
mony to come up with needlessly imprecise language about what 
science respecting reproduction was certain, namely, that the ovum 
and sperm are unusually potent units of animal or human life and that 
when conjoined as zygote, they represent genetically complete human 
life. One should not yet say a human being. ,The development in the 
womb is for two months called an embryo and thereafter, is tech-
nically the fetus, with fraternal twinning possible from the first 
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embryonic stage. From the end of the first trimester, the fetus or 
multiple fetuses display clearly recognizable human traits, including 
gender, and evidence motion as yet undetectable by the pregnant 
mother. 
The Court alleged that most American statutory laws restrictive of 
abortion, beginning in Connecticut in 1821, were enacted primarily in 
the interest of the mother's health and safety, not that of the child she 
carried . Yet the Court drew perhaps inadvertent attention to the fact 
that a tightening of the state laws in the course of the 19th century 
seems to have stemmed from the effect of the American Medical 
Association committee's report on criminal abortion in 1859, which 
had arrived at fresh ideas about the fetus in its wondrously early 
formation. This committee demanded that "exploded medical 
dogmas" (e.g., about quickening, etc.) be discarded in the light of 
what was becoming ever clearer to physicians, namely, "the existence 
of the child before birth, as a living being" (Roe u. Wade, VI, 6). But 
the Court inexplicably swerved from this early glimpse by the special-
ists of that age into fetological reality and instead, persisted in arguing 
(1) that the whole problem of when human life begins remains con-
fusing, and for the zygote/embryo/fetus they used such terms as "at 
least potential life" (VIII, 3rd reason) and insisted on the u.ncertainty 
as to "when life begins" (IX,B) and (2) that the laws against abortion 
had been primarily directed at protecting the mother, not the child 
within her, despite the fact adduced that the British statutory law, 
Lord Ellenborough's Act of 1803, had distinguished the penalty for 
the abortion of a quick fetus as death and that for the abortion of an 
unquickened fetus as a felony punishable by something less than death 
(VI, 4). This basic law, even if excessively harsh in the penalties 
attached to two degrees of abortion, became influential in the formu-
lation of the Connecticut statute without a death penalty attached. 
Yet the British law and the American state laws following it were said 
by the Court to have been motivated by three reasons; (1) upholding 
"Victorian" morality for women (Victoria, the Court should have 
known, did not begin to rule until 1837 , exactly 33 years after Ellen-
borough's Act); (2) "protecting pregnant women," and (3) only hesi-
tatingly, "the State's interest - some phrase it duty ... in protecting 
prenatal life" (VII) . Here follows the previously cited clustering of 
phrases on the alleged uncertainty about "the beginning of prenatal 
life." 
The Court drew three inappropriate conclusions from the very 
materials it had itself adduced. The justices should have remembered 
when they last examined a bean to be planted in a hill , even if it was 
back in their boyhood. We shall continue in ordinary speech to call 
such beans from a packet or box " seeds." We all know, however, that 
the white bean, when planted, is not like an ovum or a sperm. It is a 
fetal bean bush. Its first pale yellow pair of leaflets, the cotyledon, 
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needs only moisture and soil to send down the root and so send up the 
split nutritive halves of the bean burgeoning with life . From our 
present biogenetic perspective, the white bean is thus a diminutive 
fetal bean bush independent of the pod and the mother plant whence 
it came during pollination the summer before. That " mother" no 
longer even exists, for, like so many plants, beans and peas are annuals 
and live for one season. In contrast, acorns are "fetal" oaks which, 
when grown up, live long and even come to overshade all but a small 
percentage of the prodigally produced annual supply of acorns, poten-
tial successors in the forest. 
Moved into Botanical Realm 
I have moved into the botanical realm to show as vividly as possible 
what is meant by the diploid generation of life. It is only with the 
larger so-called seeds that, with the naked eye, we see what biologists 
refer to as "the alternation of generations." What we call seeds - peas, 
beans and acorns - already belong to the diploid generation, having 
been formed from the juncture of pollen and ovule of the haploid 
generation wherein the life units have half a set of chromosomes, to be 
fused in fertilization by insects, the wind or other means. 
The Supreme Court could not be expected to make an excursus 
into botany and biology. But we who regard its ruling on the rights of 
the mother over or against the fetus as morally wrong need the 
reinforcement of the awareness of the evolutionary history antedating 
any legal history. This groping legal development is as but a second in 
the eons of groaning and travail of the created order by which ever-
increasing maternal, then societal and religious and, finally, legal pro-
tection have come to be accorded the human offspring. , 
The preserved umbilical cord of Pharaoh, held high on a staff in the 
forefront of the Egyptian hosts to signify his presence, is said to be 
the origin of the battle flag and then of national flags. The placenta, as 
afterbirth, though disposed of in hospitals as waste, rather than as 
catalogued tissue, has its place in anthropological practices. As 
unsightly as is the umbilical cord, it should nevertheless also be held 
aloft, at least symbolically, as the bloody banner of life's victory over 
sheer prodigality. It has led to the nurturing, loving protection of the 
"unviable" unborn and the helpless neonates on the part of the 
mother (and often of both parents) and in the case of human society, 
protection by customs, institutions and finally, its law. 
King Solomon did not know anything about chromosomes or the 
marvelous placenta which makes it possible to carry precious but 
genetically "foreign" life in the mother's womb. But Solomon was 
wise and was also a judge. Two harlots were brought to him, 
wrangling. Each had given birth to a child. Though one had suffocated 
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hers by lying on it in the ni~ht, each claimed the living child. After 
ascertaining the circumstances and claims of the two and professing 
not to know who had the proper claim, Solomon pretended to order 
that, by a sword, the babe be divided equally between the two claim-
ants. 
The sacred text of I Kings, 3:26 continues: "Then the woman 
whose son was alive said to the king, because her heart yearned for her 
son, 'Oh, my lord, give her the living child, and by no means slay 
it .... Then the king answered and said, 'Give the living child to the 
first woman ... she is its mother.' " In the Hebrew , the phrasing is 
literally, "because her womb (racham) grew hot for her son." 
This primordial emotion, common to the fearless tigress defending 
her cubs no less than to the Hebrew harlot giving up her child to save 
it, is a source of mercy - womb-mercy - which spreads from women 
to the whole of a society. In Scripture, womb-mercy is even ascribed 
to God. The "bowels of divine mercy" is a transposition in an older 
English of the Hebrew word for the womb. The same Semitic term for 
womb-mercy is behind the heading of the two attributes of God in 
every Sura in the Koran (save one : Allah the Merciful, the Com-
passionate). How remarkable that patriarchal societies and their 
religions would find in the mother's primordial feeling for the child in 
and from her womb the ultimate human way of verbalizing God's 
mercy. How long will avant-garde women, even in their rightful con-
cern) for liberation, in appropriate social shackles, nevertheless con-
tinue to deny something so fundamental to their very being, so biolog-
ically fundamental to womanhood/motherhood, that womb-mercy 
seems to have been transferred from them, in the evolution of emo-
tions, also to men and even ascribed by Jews, Christians and Muslims 
to God? And there are counterparts of this etymology and ascription 
in other religions as well. , 
We turn from this unconventional excursion into the vast bio-
evolutionary context of the drive to protect and nurture offspring to 
the theological context necessarily kept to a minimum in the Supreme 
Court decision which cannot allow more than natural theology at 
most, not revealed theology or confessional ethics, to be decisive. Yet 
religion in Roe u. Wade was almost imperceptively used against fetal 
human life and almost wholly in favor of the pregnant woman. By this 
I mean that the injunction against abortion in the Hippocratic Oath 
was indirectly disposed of when shown to have had a religious origin, 
specifically in Pythagoreanism. Although Pythagoreanism held to the 
transmigration of souls, this word was not used. The embryo was 
regarded simply as ensouled or "animate" from the start (VI, 2). That 
the physicians of Christian societies took over the Hippocratic Oath 
and that it was professed by graduating doctors of all confessions or 
none in the lifetime of doctors still practicing, was unnoticed by the 
Court. 
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The Stoics cited by the Court must be considered no less religious 
than philosophical and their doctrine that human life begins with the 
taking of the first breath after birth (VI, 2: IX, B) could be useful in 
the momentum being built up for the primary concern of the Court -
the pregnant woman. It did not find it apposite to mention the fact 
that the same Stoics also believed in the legitimacy and even nobility 
of suicide, in contrast thus to the Pythagoreans on two points, and 
hence to the whole Hippocratic School, not simply to the Hippocratic 
Oath. As broad as the justices conceived their mandate to be, the 
Court again adduced sources tendentiously: ancient philosophers as 
religious (Pythagoreans) when it suited the purpose and only as philos-
ophers (the Stoics) when it served their preconceived end. 
The Court deftly concealed its satisfaction in building further 
momentum by adducing the doubly male chauvinist fetology of 
Aristotle, according to which the mother provides only the nurturing 
blood for the male seed and, alas, the female "embryo" (the modern 
sense is more restrictive than the ancient) takes 80 days to acquire its 
animal soul in contrast to the mere 40 days for the evidently brighter 
male "embryo." The Court noted that this fetology was taken over by 
Thomas Aquinas (VI, 3, IX, B). This is about as far as the Court dared 
to cite in the text any individual theological figure, except as it men-
tioned "the Jewish faith," "the position of a large segment of the 
Protestant community" and "Catholic dogma until the 19th century" 
(IX, B), all to devastating effect for the fetus, but apposite for an 
almost preconceived outcome in favor of the female - the protection 
of the woman's right over what goes on in her body. Apparently the 
Court was willing to let only ancient and remote religions affect its 
decision: "Ancient religion did not bar abortion" (VI, 1), it observed, 
and then allowed three modern forms of modern religious traditions in 
the United States to be noticed when favorable to the Court's pre-
meditated finding: the major tradition in modern Jewry ; mainline 
Protestant denominations fully engaged in the sexual and the women's 
rights revolution; and the papal Magisterium through the 19th century 
(without precise reference to the 1879 bull of Leo XIII, Aeterni 
Patris, whereas Thomas, Doctor Ecclesiae since 1567, became pre-
eminently authoritative, alas, with Aristotelian fetology and the three 
successive animations). 
It is not that these last three allusions are incorrect. And those of us 
who deplore the Court's decision in favor of "Jane Roe" pregnant, 
with almost no argument mounted for the fetus (cf. VII, 2; VIII, XI, 
lc) even to be judicially struck down, must acknowledge that, given 
the complexity of electron-micrographic discoveries within the 
mysterious darkness whence we all emerged, we who are pro-life might 
better not have insisted that the conceptus was legally a person. The 
haploid ovum, fertilized by the sperm to become the zygote near the 
distal funnel of the Fallopian tube, destined in the uterus to create out 
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of itself the fetal placenta and related membranes penetrating the 
uterine wall, is not yet a person. 
Anyone familiar with the history of Christian doctrine knows that 
persona, anciently-used Latin for each of the three divine Hypostases 
(the more philosophical Greek term as a Latinized plural) and then for 
the incarnate second person in two natures, Jesus Christ, knows that 
clasically persona came to be transferred from the dramatic stage to 
law, to grammar, and then to personages in certain roles, then to the 
divine persons and only in the long course of history, by a kind of 
democratization of the person of Christ, applicable to every Christian 
and from there to everyone. 
It was probably too much to have expected that "person" in the 
Reconstruction amendments to the Constitution would be construed 
in defense of the fetus as a legal person. Before these amendments, 
slaves had been counted as three-fifths of a person each, for calcu-
lating representation in Congress from the slave states. And while the 
amendments eliminated slavery in principle, for a long time the key 
term was constitutionally developed to protect artificial, corporate 
and juridical persons. Yet before Jan. 22, 1973, I myself was among 
the civil libertarians who said that the Court could quite appropriately 
construe the fetus as a person, on the analogy of the extension of 
plenary rights to former slaves and on the precedents building up in 
tort decisions relating to the fetus. But there was surely no budding of 
this idea anywhere in the decision. 
Need Religious Insights 
We who espoused the right LO life of the unborn, who were pro-life, 
should have worked not with " mistaken and exploded medical 
dogmas," outmoded legal precedents, not with outmoded ancient 
philosophies, not even with theology, but with modern microbiology, 
our principal ally. We need, however, the insights of religion and the 
precedents of communities of faith living by revealed injunctions and 
truth to motivate us in fighting for the valid and fair interpretation, at 
law and in the legislature, of the extraordinary findings of the genetics 
and fetology which belong wholly to our 20th century. 
Insofar as theology is a motor for our behavior in the public domain 
of enacted law and judicial decision as in the private domain of per-
sonal behavior, we must be clear among ourselves on three problems 
which are present even among those of us who, in varying degrees, 
oppose abortion: Jews, Christians and some humanists - of these, 
alas, all too few. 
Jews, with what Christians call the Old Testament and with cen-
turies of interpreting it in the Talmud and in later responsoriallitera-
ture and ethical treatises and customary law, while traditionally 
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opposed to abortion (note the intensification of this in the cited alter-
ation of a text in the Septuagintal passage of Isaiah above), have had a 
view of the beginnings of personal human life different from Chris-
tians using the same Testament. Christians differ also among them-
selves as to whether Scripture alone is sufficient guidance in such an 
issue as abortion. Conservative Protestants would prefer to base their 
arguments wholly on the Bible. Catholics supplement Scripture by 
tradition and the papal Magisterium on an issue as difficult as 
which scientific moderns are better informed on the biological facts 
than the ancients. Many who are either Jewish or Christian of what-
ever persuasion feel that appeal to Scripture or Scripture and tradi-
tion is valid as far as personal motivation for personal conduct is 
concerned, but not valid as the basis of argumentation in the public 
domain. 
The Old Testament, the Bible of Jews, has a number of places 
where the psalmist or the prophet refers to life in the womb, but 
necessarily determinative for Jews is the account of the creation of 
man in Genesis 2:7: "Then the Lord God formed man of dust ... and 
breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living 
being." Then came the commentary thereon in the Oral Law 
(Mishnah) eventually believed to have been given to Moses, and in the 
Gemara (the rabbinic commentary on the first part of the Mishnah). 
This Yahwist version on the origin of life could be combined with the 
Elohist version, Genesis 1: "Then God said, 'Let us make man in our 
image,' " but the effect of the two passages on Hebraic and Jewish 
fetology to the present is to define a living child somewhat like the 
Stoics, that is, after its birth and first breath, regardless of how conser-
vative Jews might have been (Orthodox Jews to the present) about the 
preciousness of that life being formed in the womb. 
But the passage in Genesis 2 has not been fetologically determina-
tive for Christians, partly because Jesus was for them the new or 
second Adam (I Cor. 15:45), an account of whose divine origin in the 
womb of the Virgin Mary became paradigmatic, strengthened by the 
account of John the Baptist greeting Jesus by leaping within the 
womb of his mother, Elizabeth, when Mary approached (Luke 
1:41-44). There are indications in the New Testament that abortion 
was abhorred, for example, in the use of pharmakeia and cognates and 
in such a context as to suggest an evil drug. But it is not necessary to 
belabor these places, for the opposition of early Christians to abortion 
is well documented in writings contemporaneous with those like the 
epistle to Barnabas and the Didache. This is not the place to rehearse 
the history of Christian attitudes toward abortion in different eras and 
different regions and confessional traditions, except for two remarks. 
The first concerns the ever more important role of the Virgin Mary 
in the theology and piety of Christianity in all the great schisms of 
Christendom - Catholic, Orthodox and other Eastern traditions. 
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Protestants, who renounce the mediatorial role of the Virgin have, at I 
most, a vestigial Marian doctrine, if any. And women's liberationists 
- Protestants and some Catholics, too, among them - feel that Mary 
has become a symbol of "male-chauvinist theological subordination of 
women" even as she herself is exalted as Queen of Heaven. In the 
present context, opponents of abortion and others should know what 
was at stake when she was proclaimed Mother of God (Theotokos) at 
the Third Ecumenical Council at Ephesus in 431 against the Nestor-
ians. The biological knowledge of the ancient world in which this 
council struggled for clarity held, for the most part, that the male seed 
alone shaped the internal nature and external contours of the fetal 
child "nurtured on menstrual blood," the mother's only contribution. 
On this human analogy, some Christians both at Ephesus and at the 
Fourth Ecumenical Council at Chalcedon in 451, held that the Child 
conceived by the Holy Spirit of God was not fully human or the 
bearer only of the divine epiphany. These two councils together, 
therefore, were saying theologically and, more specifically, christolog-
ically, that Jesus was fully human and that Mary was the Mother of 
the Redeemer, that contrary to both the science and the popular 
belief of the day, Mary contributed the human "seed" so that her Son 
as one person in two natures, human and divine, was fully human in 
body, mind and will because of her. Feminist theologians are wrong in 
disparaging Mary as a paradigm of submission. Her exaltation was the 
way the ancient Church safeguarded the complete manhood of Jesus. 
Theories of Soul's Origin 
The second historic remark is related to that same scientific/popular 
"genetics" /fetology of that age. Following are t~ee theories of the 
origin cif the soul held by various Christians in that age: (1) pre-exis-
tence and embodiment as . a kind of fall into the material world as a 
trial, (2) creation ad hoc and infusion at some point in fetal develop-
ment, and (3) traducianism . Only the last view understood body and 
soul as together at once from conception and, by coincidence, under-
stood also that there was, in some sense, "a female seed" as the 
counterpart of semen, although it could only be postulated, never 
observed. Tertullian of Carthage (d. ca. 220), a married theologian, the 
father of Latin theology in the sense of having coined its basic terms, 
was a traducianist. 
Martin Luther, in reviving indirectly the traducianist view of Ter-
tullian, when he thought he was being faithful to Augustine's discus-
sion of Tertullian, contributed to the development of enhanced sensi-
bility to the right of protection of the fetus, ensouled, according to 
Tertullian and Luther, from the moment of conception and deriving 
its traits from the "seeds" of both parents. 
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By quoting mainline, present-day Protestant views on abortion, the 
justices were overlooking the fact that the restrictive state laws of the 
19th century had been put in place mostly by Protestant legislators 
under the influence of Protestant physicians and lawyers, as well as 
preachers and theologians, and that the shift in this grouping came 
very swiftly and relatively recently. When we look at the theological 
context of the Roe v. Wade decision we may note some religious 
factors as well as the so-called secular and often quite disparagingly-
used humanistic factors. These were part of the groundswell which 
caused the Court to go so far beyond what the case called for. 
In mainline Protestantism, referred to by the Court as sympathetic 
with its emerging decision, there had been a swift erosion of the single 
most important doctrine of classical Protestantism, itself the repristin-
ation and, indeed, intensification of Augustinianism in the 16th 
century with respect to predestination or to the decrees of election 
and reprobation. Today, mainline Protestant theologians in the United 
States have been facing the cumulative implications of Darwinian, 
Marxist, Freudian and kindred psychological determinism, along with 
the genetic, psycho-chemical and socio-biological determinism, the 
latter just beginning to show its impact on Protestant theologians and 
denominational leaders at the time of the decision. The doctrine of 
predestination had once imparted a certain dark dignity even to the 
reprobate, for ex protesso he and the elect differed not at all from 
each other in merit or rather, in demerit, both culpable because of the 
sin of Adam and Eve. They differed only in their eternal destinies 
because of God's inexplicable and admittedly arbitrary grace shown to 
the elect few. 
In the decade of Roe v. Wade, that whole edifice of classical Protes-
tantism had long since been partly dismantled or had even collapsed of 
itself for most Lutherans, many Calvinists in the mainstream denomin-
ations, and for probably all Anglicans. It should be added that predes-
tination also does not feature in the sermons of the largely Protestant 
electronic church of the extreme right, nor in the biblical colleges and 
denominations linked to the beamed message of repristinated morality 
and chauvinistic patriotism. With the loss of a high sense of predestina-
tion, there had also come, among mainline Protestants, a weakening in 
the grasp on the traditional eschatological details and for some theo-
logians in these denominations, even an extinction of belief in per-
sonal immortality with only a vague and remote sense of Christ's 
second advent and the general resurrection and last jUdgment. In such a 
context, concern for the living mother and her fleeting sovereignty 
over self and her fulfillment in this knowable present life had become 
swiftly pervasive among men, no less than women, among worshipers 
in the pews, no less than among the pastors and their theological 
professors. Variants of the social gospel, including the liberation of the 
racially downtrodden and the incompletely enfranchised women, had 
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pressed to the margins or possibly in some cases replaced the good 
news that in Christ, Christians have not only some sense of an eternal 
quality in the present life through grace, but also a foretaste of a 
consummation of grace in eternity. 
This shift in soteriological emphasis, along with growing anxiety 
about the degree to which persons even in the Church and in a democ-
racy are free with or without grace amid the evident predeterminisms 
of modalities never imagined or surmised by Luther or Calvin made 
Protestants determined to show their freedom in the limited area of 
birth control and family planning, ever more tolerant of perhaps only 
early abortion as a means thereto. In any case, the drive to enjoy the 
superficial freedom from having too many children or from the 
burden of any offspring at all in wilfully childless marriages, blinded 
these prevailingly college-educated mainline Protestants to the facts of 
biological laboratories and science columns in their papers and periodi-
cals which spread before their eyes f.etal facts which would have 
deepened even further in an Aristotle or an Augustine, in a Thomas or 
a Luther the sense of the mystery of all life and particularly of human 
life from conception to death . The sense of mystery of an afterlife 
would have been made more, rather than less, plausible in the scien-
tific revelations of the spirituality of matter itself at the subatomic 
level of the play of points of energy in space as relatively remote from 
each other as stars in the galaxies. 
Have Entered Context of Decision 
With these sharp comments about the radical displacement of 
theological concerns, particularly in mainline Protestantism, we have 
already entered the social context of the decision in Roe v. Wade. 
About the psycho-dynamics of this decision, we know more perhaps, 
than about any other, at least in terms of pre-trial activities of groups 
favorable to leniency in abortion and of those opposed. We also have 
indirect but compelling accounts of the inter chamber motivations 
leading to the formal deliberations of the Burger court. It would be of 
little interest on this sad commemoration to have surmises of a non-
jurist much further removed from the original scene than those who 
have already written, except for him to remark here that in the institu-
tionalized drive for demonstrating independence of even a conserva-
tive court from a conservative president who had made clear his 
opposition to abortion, the justices were disposed to show they could 
be "liberal" on some issues. That is part of the psychodynamics of the 
Court. Of more interest to you from me as a historian would be some 
reflections on the larger American social and socio-political and, 
indeed, cultural context - cultural in the sense of the unarticulated 
presuppositions and overt achievements of the American variant of the 
North Atlantic civilization. 
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Probably in the United States only a few legal specialists on the 
federal republic of Germany's constitution were aware of how West 
Germans had reacted with detailed new safeguards to the horrendous 
activities, not only of the Nazi government, but also of the medical 
and legal professions, perhaps even more than of the Wehrmacht 
officers in the whole range of German atrocities which we call the 
Holocaust. A recent article, indeed, is entitled "The Medicalization of 
Auschwitz." Among these safeguards embodied in the new German 
constitution were restraints on human experimentation and abortion. 
It was to members of the American medical community that the grisly 
performance of its erstwhile German colleagues was most unsettling. 
Yet American medicine had acquired information of value from the 
macabre experimentations of the Nazis on a scale of enormity 
unparalleled in history and also from long-held secret experiments by 
the Japanese on none other than American prisoners of war. It is often 
said we become like the enemy. We oppose. 
Despite the many past great decisions where the Court gained its 
eminence by opposing the majority of the population on some issue, 
in Roe v. Wade the Court heeded what it considered the regnant view 
and discounted, as culturally vestigial, the spokespersons of what 
would eventually become the near tidal wave of reaction in the self-
styled Moral Majority and in persistent Catholic opposition to abor-
tion. Even the dissenting Justice Rehnquist's opinion made no use of 
pro-life argumentation and documentation and centered it in an intra-
constitutional problem of the transposition of the "compelling state 
interest" test from one clause to another in the 14th amendment, 
which would at best be only preliminary to placing the human fetus's 
right to life on a par with that of the mother. 
In retrospect, to be fair to the Court precisely in terms of the larger 
social context in which its members as citizen-observers are necessarily 
a part, we acknowledge that the country and therefore, he Court, 
found itself in the prophase and anaphase in the meiosis of American 
society, to carryover terms from reproductive biology to the Ameri-
can body politic, in four overlapping revolutions: (1) the black civil 
rights movement; (2) the pro-life recoil from an inadequately legiti-
mated war against civilians; (3) the sexual revolution with respect to 
the sudden and almost universal shift in the mores of the youth, which 
brought turmoil to all homes and perhaps particularly to the homes of 
generally liberal and conventional people, including those with college 
degrees in the liberal arts and sciences; and (4) the women's liberation 
movement. A fifth revolution came largely after the Court's decision 
- the movement for homosexual rights. 
Of the first four revolutions, the most complicated for society and 
hence for the court, was women's liberation, because inherent in it 
were at least two feminist ideals, sometimes upheld by the same 
feminist, more likely held by sometimes shrill opposition in the same 
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movement. The first ideal was of the woman as distinctive - her 
insight, achievement, value system, indeed her contribution to the 
whole of civilization too long suppressed or marginalized. The other 
feminist ideal was the essential equality of men and women in work 
and in most other respects except for the reproductive function. The 
latter had a strong component of professional concern for equality in 
jobs from factory to fire-fighting. The first was not wholly incompatible 
with an updating of the earlier maternal ideal and its service-oriented 
analogues (nuns, nurses), but the second feminist liberation ideal con-
tains in itself only a partly differentiated fourth ideal (see below). 
Earlier Causes Suppressed 
Since such earlier feminist causes as plenary legal and political rights 
had been long surpassed except for those symbolized by the ERA, the 
area of struggle in 1973 was the realm of jobs and professions and 
positions of authority . A fourth "ideal," feminist, was then the exact 
opposite of the traditional "maternal" norm, namely, the equality of 
men and women in the workaday world up to the unwillingness of 
women to bear children. The fight for equal compensation had 
become so intense by the time of Roe u. Wade that many a woman felt 
she had to be freed of the potential encumbrances of her gender to 
compete with men for the same positions and to be equal to men in 
the consequences of sexual activity. This is the sense of the phrase 
"control over her own body." Abortion became a means of that con-
trol to make a woman the virtual equal of a man in sexual life. (In the 
past, abortion had been resorted to mostly becaust of supernumerary 
progeny or because of the shame of illegitimacy.) Hence contraception 
and abortion were high on the agenda of this fourth type of feminist. 
Moreover, this position was taken not without some altruistic concern 
for the underprivileged. ' 
Women of all economic classes had been involved in the civil rights 
movement and had consciousness-raising experience in the collabora-
tion of whites with blacks for civil rights, while the whites saw the 
degree to which rural and ghetto black women were often disadvan-
taged by supernumerary children who suffered from diminished care 
from a working mother who was often the sole support for her family. 
White women took notice also of the consequent lower educational 
achievements of black children on a national average. The final phase 
of the civil rights movement and the beginnings of the modern 
feminist thrust were competitive. White women inadvertently inter-
cepted the flow of some energy and national attention from the 
incompleted civil rights movement. Feminists of type two thought, 
however, that they could· make common cause with blacks and the 
poor in general by advocating what they thought would spell a 
measure of relief for poor women and what for tl],emselves, .as profes-
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sionals in various fields, would mean approximate man-likeness for 
however long a woman should choose not to have children. 
The sexual revolution fed into women's willingness to espouse as 
something feminine that which is expressly not maternal. In the mean-
time, the civil rights revolution had made it appear to most black 
spokespersons for the poor that equal access to contraception and safe 
abortion was a way to equalize the poor and the rich in a moral zone 
which held clear promise of economic and educational advantages for 
the poor. 
We have already indicated how mainline Protestant leadership, 
partly in its generally courageous espousal of civil rights, women's 
rights and problems of the poor had, in this case independently of 
these ca}lses, lost several theological bases for the opposition to abor-
tion - the atrophy of the doctrine of predestination, the contextuali-
zation of New Testament ethical standards, a recognition that all reli-
gions, including Christianity, had too long sanctioned the subordina-
tion of women to men in church and society. 
Besides all this, there was the wholly spurious claim which, to be 
sure, was not allowed to be part of the argument of the Court, though 
it was in the mind of the justices, too, namely that a concern for the 
new life in the womb was a confessional, in the language of the Consti-
tution, a "sectarian" preoccupation, not universal, thus allegedly chal-
lenging the principle of the separation of church and state. 
Besides the known pressure groups working directly or indirectly on 
the Court in 1973, there was a natural civil libertarian coalition of the 
poor, the blacks, feminists of two or three types, sexualliberationists, 
and mainline Protestant and almost all Jewish religious leadership in 
religion, medicine, psychiatry, social work, law, education and econ-
omics waiting expectantly for a "liberal" decision. I say this as a 
Protestant liberal and a sometime member of the executive committee 
of the Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union. I am still concerned with 
civil liberties, but to be born is a fundamental freedom. And I am 
profoundly distressed, as a civil libertarian, that the weakest and most 
inarticulate being, the unborn, with its genetic code fixed and needing 
only time to become one of us, was not heard or really even heeded in 
the Court 10 years ago, only the pregnant mother. 
It is my hope on the 10th anniversary of Roe v. Wade that women, 
feminists in the lead, will eventually tell us what those unwitting male 
chauvinists, King Solomon and Aristotle, understood even better than 
feminists of type one, namely, that a major source of mercy in human 
societies, the emotion of pity and the yearning to give succor, the 
capacity for disinterested friendship, arose not in the mind of the male 
nor in the hearts of men and women, but in the primordial umbilical 
relationship between mother and offspring which leaves its permanent 
reminder at the center of our bodies. 
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It should be the constant sign that the generations are literally 
bound together by that cord of two red arteries and one blue vein, 
created out of the diploid tissue of the morula, in part, alien to the 
mother's system, but drawing nutriment and oxygen from the mother, 
without the two blood systems ever coming into direct contact. The 
miraculously evolved placenta made mother and offspring physically 
and emotionally closer than lover and beloved can ever become, even 
in ecstasy, for the mother and offspring are united also in sorrow-
Rachel weeping for her children. 
Perversions, Aberrations 
There have been perversions and aberrations of this bond in all 
times and climes. Mothers in the Bible are recorded as having com-
mitted cannibalism in famine. Men demanded that their women fling 
their firstborn into the maw of Moloch. Medea, ferocious in her con-
jugal rage, is not alone in ancient Greek literature, slaying her own 
offspring to spite and sicken her alienated spouse. The Roman pater 
familias held the right of life or death over not only the child in the 
womb, but also the child as infant or even as youth. But the seat of 
mercy was the womb. Feminists, surely among the most ethically 
sensitized groups in contemporary society in other respects;" must 
again become, as it were, queens of Sheba, the worthy equals of wise 
Solomon. They must do this not by denying in themselves what he 
knew from observation, not by succeeding to the ancient prerogatives 
of the pater familias as sole sovereign over the human life generated 
within them, but true to their deepest femininity and plenary rights as 
feminists even of type two, by acknowledging in the light of reproduc-
tive evolution that the whole of creation groaned in travail to make 
possible what every female mammal and no male rriammal can do: 
conceive, foster, protect and bring forth new human life from within 
herself. The present stance of many feminists, carrying instinctively, 
emotionally more conserving women with them with their "body con-
trol" rationale (euphemistically "pro choice") will one day be seen in 
retrospect as a temporary psycho-emotional mutation in the larger 
evolutionary context of the feminine psyche legitimately clamoring 
for equality of rights and responsibilities in all areas where another 
human life is not placed in jeopardy. 
There is still time for women to ponder what they have done and 
what has been legitimated by the Supreme Court in their alleged best 
interest. But they should be warned that society is at peril. The qual-
ity of mercy, to the extent to which it pervades society, is replenished 
in each gene;:ation as women bring forth life from the earth. They not 
only bring forth a child, but they have invisibly and collectively in 
each generation suffused that quality of mercy by which men and 
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women are said to be like God, the merciful, the compassionate, the 
Creator of heaven and earth, after Whose image and likeness He 
created them male and female. 
The Elohist did not know that the 23rd chromosome in man and 
in woman is gender-determinant. This chromosome is of two shapes: a 
cross represented by X and a relatively much smaller shape like the 
Hebrew letter ay in, represented conventionally by a Y. The chromo-
some for female gender is XX and for a male, XY. It has only recently 
been discovered that while in birds the basic form from which the female 
is adapted is male, the basic body pattern in mammals is female and 
from that the male is adapted. In Hebrew, ayin means the perceptive 
"eye. " 
Women are not only procreative but are actually more nearly nor-
mative as to what the human being is . Where is the image and likeness 
of God in human beings, and when is that countenance of mercy lifted 
up upon us? It is where the weak or defenseless are protected. It is 
when pregnant mothers say yes to life. It is when the instititutions of 
society fully recognize that even as God is rich in mercy, so may we be 
likewise. 
Roe v. Wade cannot be the final, constitutional word of a humane 
and enlightened society. The unborn, increasingly protected and 
individually beloved, progressively protected by the sanctions of reli-
gion and law, must be heard in a greater court than Solomon's. It must 
be a court which will not threaten to use the sword of sovereignty to 
divide child from mother, mother from mercy, but will cut away "the 
exploded dogma" of a temporarily blinded guild of constitutional 
craftsmen to clarify at law what is clear to the biologist's and the 
geneticist's eye. A child is given, though it be very small , its first 
precarious nesting place in the folds of maternal tissues beyond the 
uterus, a sign of God's own embodied mercy toward us. 
In the exercise of that quality, un strained , may we b "like God." 
* * * * * 
Author's note: As the foregoing is a lecture altered as an article, I gathered 
some titles of works which have influenced me. I begin, however, with earl ier 
writings of my own: "Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American 
Debate on Abortion," Theological Studies, XXXI (March, 1970), pp. 10·75 (on 
the ethical model therein proposed allowing for a very limited number of abor· 
tions, see The Morality of Abortion, ed. by John T. Noonan, Jr. [Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 146·171, where I distinguish from the Chris· 
tian ideal what can be enforced in the public domain); "The Democratization of a 
Near Constant [Ideal] in History," foreword to A bortion and Social Justice, ed . by 
Thomas W. Hilgers and Dennis J. Horan (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1972), pp. 
ix·xix; "Safer Footing than Blind R eason Stumbling without Fear: Reflections on 
Bioethics in our Civic, 'Religious, Historica l, Professional Context," Bioethics and 
the Law, ed. by Leonard J. Nelson, III (Grand Rapids: Eerdman, 1983). 
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The Hippocrat ic Oath and Modernizations of, the Decision o f Roe v. Wade, and 
m any other documents can be found annotated in Ethics in Medicine: Historical 
Perspectives and Contemp orary Concerns, ed. by Stanley Joel Reiser , Arthur J. 
Dyck a nd William J. Curran (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977). Other arti cles include 
The Placenta and Fetal Membranes, Claude Villee (Baltimore : Williams and 
Wilkins, 1960); A bortion and the Early Church, Michael J. Gorman (Downers 
Grove, Ill . : In tervarsity Press, 1982); " Medicalized Killing in Auschwitz," Psychia-
try , XLV (Nov., 1982), pp. 283-297; Changing Attitudes of the Protestant Clergy 
Toward Abortion (to appear), Wilson Yates ; "Mercy as a Universalized, Non-
Utilitarian Component in an Emerging Environmental Ethic," G. H . Williams, 
Ecological Ethics, ed. by John Voss and Robert Nash (Cambridge : American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1984); Th e Brethren (of the Burger Court], Bob 
Woodward and Scott Armstrong (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1979); West 
German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade with Commentaries, 
special issue of Th e John Ma rshall Jo urnal of Practice and Procedure, IX:3 
(Spring, 1976), pp. 551-695; Where Are We Now?: The Supreme Court Decisions 
Ten Years After Roe v. Wade , Educational Publications of Americans United fo r 
Life , no. 17 (Chicago, 1983). 
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